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THE APPARENT INEVITABILITY OF MIXED
GOVERNMENT
John Hart Ely*
There are few positions more demonstrable than that there
should be, in every republic, some permanent body to correct
the prejudices, check the intemperate passions, and regulate
the fluctuations, of a popular assembly.
-Alexander Hamilton at New York
Ratifying Convention'

The "dominant political theory" in England from the midseventeenth century well into the nineteenth was "the age-old
theory of mixed government."2 As such it was the object of seri3
ous consideration by the founders of our country. Its original
formulation held that the ideal government should comprise
elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. 4 Given the
circumstances of our separation from England, of course, monarchy was expeditiously expelled from the American version.
However, "the abolition of monarchr had not altered the basic
postulates of the science of politics," and the general idea here
became that there should be an executive (elected somehow,
probably indirectly) to provide energetic action when that was
needed, a popular legislature generally empowered to make
policy and provide the rules by which we are governed-and an
aristocratic branch to moderate between the other two and in
particular to check their respective tendencies toward despotism
on the one hand and anarchy on the other. 6
* Richard A. Hausler Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. J. Elliot, ed., 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 301 (WilliamS. Hein & Co., Inc., 1863).
2. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 36-37,41,60-62, 75,
117-18 (Liberty Fund, 2d ed. 1998) ("Vile").
3. See generally Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787
(W.W. Norton, 1969) ("Wood F'). Cf. Vile at 91-92 (quoting Montesquieu) (cited in note
2).
4. Vile at 37-41 (cited in note 2); Wood I at 19 (cited in note 3).
5. Wood I at 202 (cited in note 3).
6. Id. at 19, 198,208.
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Generally this aristocratic element was envisioned as residing in the upper house of the legislature.' (Some suggested that
these "senators" be installed for life, others that they be chosen
by an electoral college. 8) For a time there was bruited the notion
that lineage and property might serve as suitable surrogates for
wisdom and a deliberative character.9 However, these equations
drew sufficient fire from such committed democrats as Thomas
Paine 10 to send them (at least officially) into hasty retreat and induce a return to a more direct (though still impure) "wisdom and
deliberation" rationalization of the Senate. 11
The pattern of the old system of thought was followed, therefore,
to this extent: the three qualities requisite to an effective system of
government were enumerated-a concern for the interest of the
whole, wisdom, and dispatch-and these were related to the need
to combine democratic and aristocratic elements in the legislature
with an efficient executive power. In Massachusetts at this time
the aristocracy was defined as "the gentlemen of education, fortune and leisure," and although, therefore, class divisions were acknowledged, indeed welcomed, they were not the heredi~ class
12
divisions of the rejected European theories of government.

Even such faint nods to aristocracy were too much for some
of the founding generation, and further "new explanation[s] of
the position of the senate" were created-that the lower house
would represent the people, the upper house the states as entities, or, more intelligibly, that the two houses would not so much
represent different interests as they would check one another
and thus contribute to the more general desires for deliberation
and protection from tyranny. 13
Madison in The Federalist was still trying to fmd a way of distinguishing the two houses of the legislature from each other "by
every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all
proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican
government," for the advantage of bicameralism still seemed to be
"in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies."
Yet the genuine principles of republicanism were necessarily
leading others to disavow any suggestion of a different social basis
7. !d. at 217, 163.
8. !d. at 213, 216.
9. !d. at 217-22. Obviously the protection of property against a majoritarian "levelling spirit" was at least an unspoken part of the point here too. ld. at 209, 557.
10. ld. at 221,223-24, 237; Vile at 121-22 (cited in note 2).
11. E.g., note 1; Wood I at 556 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth) (cited in note 3).
12. Vile at 165-66 (cited in note 2); see also Wood I at 556, 557-58 (quoting Alexander Hamilton) (cited in note 3).
13. Wood I at 237,244-54,558 (cited in note 3).
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for the upper houses, and were in fact turning them into another
kind of representation of the people, often of course differently recruited, and with their organization and tenure emphasizing stability and continuity, but with their existence justified publicly if not
always privately almost solely in terms of a functional Whiggish
14
division of mistrusted legislative power .

But whatever the shifts in rationalization, the Senate continued to be envisioned as fewer in number than the House of
Representatives, older, wiser, and "refined through a filtration
process" of election not directly by the people but rather by the
state legislatures. "The resemblance to the aristocratic House of
Lords and the patrician Senate of ancient Rome was never lost,
and men continued to invoke the rapidly disintegrating theory of
mixed government to explain the character of the Senate. "15
Thus the Federalists may have concocted less elitist rationalizations for the upper house, but in their hearts they knew that
at least to a degree that body would also embody the vestiges of
mixed government. The term had all but disappeared from public debate, apparently forever. 16 However, the wiser heads
among the Federalists, John Adams most conspicuously, 17 understood that the Constitution as drafted and ratified preserved
much of its essence.
Whereas the members of the House of Representatives
were to be at least 25 years old, serve two-year terms, and be
chosen "by the People," the members of the Senate were to be
at least 30 years of age, serve six-year terms, and, most importantly, be chosen "by the Legislature[s}" of their home states.
As for the President, he was to be chosen by a college comprising "Electors" sent from each state in a number totalling the
state's Representatives and Senators combined. The document
further provided that the Electors were to be "appoint[ed] in
such manner as the Legislature [of the state] shall direct" and
(there being no requirement that the Electors be popularly
elected) they were under no obligation in voting for President to
14. Id. at 254-55.
15. ld. at 553-54.
16. Thus, to take an example that prefigures my conclusion, it does not appear in
contemporary debates over judicial review.
17. "However much Adams may have leaned towards mixed government in 1776 or
1780, there was, of course, no chance of such views being accepted, otherwise than in the
watered-down form of a bicameral legislature and a veto power for an elected governor."
Vile at 163 (cited in note 2). See also Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American
Revolution 267 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1991) ("Wood IF'). Adams' relative candor on this
issue helped account for his (also relative) isolation. Wood I at 569, 575, 586 (cited in
note 3). See also id. at 554 (quoting Dickenson, Hamilton, and Morris).
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follow the wishes of the people of the state. (Note the double
"filtration" here: the state legislature could choose the Electors
any way it saw fit, and the Electors could vote for President any
way they saw fit. 18 ) Thus Adams was right: significant elements
of "mixed government" survived into the original document.
Of course much has changed since then. Since the nineteenth century it has been the practice in every state for the people generally to choose the presidential Electors-prior to that
some states had the legislature make the selection-and it is by
now the universal understanding that the Electors are to vote for
the presidential and vice-presidential candidates a majority of
the state's people have selected.19 It is true that the Constitution
has not been officially amended in either of these respects, but it
has become clear nonetheless that a dispositive deviation from
either practice would not be tolerated. 20 As the Supreme Court
noted in 1952, the Electors "are not the independent body and
superior characters which they were intended to be" and thus
"are not left to the exercise of their own judgment."21 Both filters are therefore gone: the Electors are elected by the people,
and they vote for the presidential ticket the people tell them to
vote for. In other words, the people elect the President. 22
18. "The electoral college was designed by men who did not want the election of
the President to be left to the people." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,376 n.8 (1963).
19. In 1872 electors pledged to Democratic presidential candidate Horace Greeley
felt obliged to vote for him despite the fact that he had died between the general election
and the Electoral College's vote. EdwardS. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers
1787-1984 at 385-86 (Randall W. Bland, Theodore T. Hindson and Jack W. Peltason eds.,
New York U. Press, 1984).
20. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 Const. Comm.
201,203-06 (1996).
21. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 n.l5 (1952) (quoting S. Rep. No. 22, 19th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1826)).
22. It is true that since the early nineteenth century almost all states have employed
a statewide unit rule giving all of the state's electoral votes to the candidate who wins the
popular vote statewide. The unit rule was obviously adopted and is retained by most
states, often defensively, as a way of increasing their clout. The federal Constitution does
not have anything to say either way about this, although the Twelfth Amendment provides that when no candidate receives a majority of the electoral vote and the presidential election is consequently thrown into the House of Representatives, "the votes shall
be taken by states" and, surprisingly (to me at any rate) each state is to get one vote. At
least as of 1996 only Maine and Nebraska employed something other than the unit rule,
electing some Electors by statewide vote and others by congressional district. William
Josephson and Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. Legis. 145, 161
(1996).
Certainly the merits of the statewide unit rule are debatable. For obvious reasonsA wins a few states by a landslide, B a few others by a nose-the unit rule renders real
the possibility that the candidate with the highest nationwide popular vote will lose. The
last time this actually happened was in 1876, when Rutherford B. Hayes was elected
President despite the fact that his opponent, Samuel J. Tilden, had garnered more popu-
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As regards the Senate, the amendment was more official.
23
The Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, provides that
the Senate is to be elected in the same manner as the House, that
24
is, "by the people" rather than the state legislatures. Of course
some differences between the two houses remain, and while a
couple of them seem faintly relevant, it is difficult to see any as
making a significant difference to the subject under discussion.
A member of the House generally is elected by the people of
only one section of the state, 25 a Senator by the people of the entire state. No reason comes readily to mind for supposing that
this renders the Senate more "aristocratic" or deliberative,
though it must to some degree tend to make the Senators less
parochial (or, at least, parochial in the service of a somewhat
larger entity). The difference between the minimum ages for the
two offices obviously remains, but seems unimportant. With
longer life expectancies, 25 and 30 mus.t seem even less different
than they did in the eighteenth century, and in any event the
overwhelming majority of Representatives are over 30. As for
the difference between six-year and two-year terms, it is too glib
simply to respond that most Representatives are repeatedly
reelected. They are indeed, but at the cost of spending something like half their time in office raising money and campaigning. Assuming that Senators have to spend roughly the same
amount of time per election cycle engaged in such activities,26
one year constitutes only one-sixth of their terms, leaving the
Senators more time for deliberation and putting them in somewhat lesser bondage to shifting popular passions.

Jar votes nationwide. However, it seems impossible to predict ex ante what blocs of voters or sorts of candidates are likely to be thus advantaged, rendering the unit rule difficult, if not impossible, to regard as reinserting an aristocratic element into the systemquestionable though it may be for other reasons.
23. In fact, "by 1912, Senators were already picked by direct election in 29 of the 48
states, notwithstanding the language of Article 1." Rotunda, 13 Const. Comm. at 2f17
(cited in note 20). The story of the devices used prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment thus to circumvent Article I is succinctly told in id. at 206-09.
24. But cf. Legal Times 13 (June 8, 1998) (Judge Douglas Ginsburg addressing
graduates of George Mason Law School):
The path from the original Constitution to our present situation, and why we
took it, is too long, and too sad, a story for this occasion. In my view, the greatest mistake (sic) was the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, which in 1913
provided for the direct election of United States senators.
25. Seven of the fifty states have only one Representative, whose district is obviously coextensive with that of the state's two Senators.
26. To the extent this is inaccurate, one should alter the analysis accordingly. In
any event the percentage of their members' terms that must be devoted to campaigning
for reelection differs significantly between the two houses.
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Finally, and most would probably say this is most important,
there is the Senate's traditional self-image as a more mature and
responsible body than the House. We heard much of thismainly from the Senators themselves but to a degree from the
media as well-during the recent impeachment imbroglio. And
yes, I am aware that the House voted two articles of
impeachment and the Senate failed to convict on either of them,
which I join most Americans in thinking the right result. 27
However, the difference between the votes seems quite
clearly the result not of any comparative maturity of judgment
on the Senate's part but rather of two other factors. The first is
the fact that the House was the charging body, the grand jury if
you will, the Senate the body whose vote would actually evict the
President from office- a difference the members of both houses
simply cannot have avoided taking into account. The second is
more obvious, that while it takes a simple majority of the House
to accuse, it takes two-thirds of the Senate to convict. (I am
aware that the Senate votes were 45-55 and 50-50, each short of
a majority, albeit one by the skin of its teeth. I am also aware
that legislators faced with clearly losing causes often vote with
the winners.)
Nonetheless, 45% of the Senators voted to convict on what
had become Article I, whereas 53% of the members of the
House had voted to send it over. Particularly in light of the fact
that the House vote was only an indictment, this is not a terribly
large difference: fifty-three percent does not even flirt with twothirds. What had become Article II makes the point even more
dramatically: true, only 50% of the Senators voted to convict on
it, but only 51% of the House had voted to refer it! This barely
amounts to a difference of any sort, let alone one that suggests
an observable difference between the maturity and deliberateness of the two bodies. 28 (Recall as well that the House rejected
27. The ambiguity respecting the breadth of my endorsement-it seems pretty clear
most Americans would not go along with me here-is intentional. Am I the only one
who thinks impeachment without conviction may have been about right? I do not regard
self-serving one-sided "sex" between the most powerful man on earth and a physically
unremarkable and understandably starstruck 22-year-old subordinate as a simple case of
sex "between consenting adults." Beyond that, perjury and obstruction of justice are
felonies, even when in context they are not, as I said early and publicly, the sort of "high
crimes and misdemeanors" that warrant removing the President from office. ("Low" is
the adjective that comes more readily to mind.)
28. A number of Senators suggested another way in which the House had behaved
with inadequate maturity and deliberation: by voting almost entirely along straight party
lines. See, e.g., New York Times A22 (Feb. 12, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Tim Johnson,
Democrat of South Dakota):
I think [our votes send] a very loud message to the House of Representatives.
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the other two articles of impeachment its judiciary committee
had recommended, one of them by essentially a two to one
vote.) If it's maturity you seek, and like me you regard a disposition not to evict President Clinton as a sign ther~o~, tg- t~e
American people, only 31% of whom favored conVIction. Its
enough to tempt one to identify the people generally as the true
aristocracy, were that not to drain the term of all meaning.
I don't know about you, but when Chief Justice Rehnquist
entered the Senate Chamber, I felt much as I did at the end of
William Golding's Lord of the Flies: Thank God, everything's
going to be all right. A grownup has arrived.
I suppose that vignette gives my thesis away: that despite
the substantial assimilation of the character of the Senate to that
of the House of Representatives, mixed government survives.
For all the while the role of the Senate as a comparatively sober,
well-educated, and only indirectly elected elite was on the wane,
the comJ'arable role of the Supreme Court was symmetrically
waxing. The Court, indeed the entire federal judiciary, is a
comparatively old, well-educated, isolated, thoughtful, and wise
institution whose input into the laws that govern us is significant.
Don't ever, ever, send to the Senate again articles of impeachment that are this
weak and partisan.
Weak maybe, though we've seen that just about the same percentage of Senators voted
for them as Congressmen. Partisan? The truth is that both houses behaved in disturbingly partisan ways. In the House the Republicans voted 98% and 95% for the two articles that were adopted, the Democrats 98% and 98% against them. On the two articles
that didn't make it out of the House, however, there were Republican "defection" rates
of 12% and 36%. In the Senate the Republicans voted in 82% and 91% blocks in favor
of the charges, thereby lending some substance to Mr. Johnson's implied claim of lesser
Senate partisanship. However, neither pany in the House (nor the Senate Republicans)
matched Mr. Johnson's very own team, the Senate Democrats, who voted 100% (45.())
against both anicles!
29. New York Times A16 (Feb. 3, 1999).
30. In the early days American judges were often "aristocrats," including some who
were not even lawyers, and their decisions were expected to, and undoubtedly did, reflect
their socially elevated status. Wood II at 71·72, 323-34 (cited in note 17). However, prior
to Marbury judicial jurisdiction was necessarily, and even thereafter it was in fact almost
exclusively, a common law jurisdiction, not involving the constitutional invalidation of
statutes or other work of the political branches. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, decided in 1856 and notoriously invalidating the Missouri Compromise, was only the second Supreme Court decision striking down an act of Congress (Marbury itself being the
first).
Dred Scott was also the first Supreme Court decision to invoke the documentally
unprovided, for that matter oxymoronic, doctrine of "substantive due process," essentially authorizing a judicial second-guess of the wisdom of legislation pursuant to no particular constitutional command but rather to some undefined amalgam of the Court's
estimations of American tradition and right reason-obviously the very sort of jurisdiction an advocate of judicial participation as the aristocratic element in a "mixed government" would think appropriate.
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Marbury v. Madison, written by his appointee John Marshall and
mining from the Constitution the institution of judicial review,
must have made John Adams dance a-well, crack a smile anyway. Six years, horsefeathers: try a life term.
If I had my way, the Supreme Court would not function as
an engine of mixed government. Democracy and Distrus(1 is an
extended argument for the proposition that the Court should not
act as an elite impediment to what it takes to be the substantive
excesses of the politically responsible branches but, on the contrary, as a perfecter of the democratic process. You will not be
surprised to learn, however, that I do not always have my way:
Democracy and Distrust is characteristically the object of ritual
compliment and rapid dismissal. 32
Instead, the currently dominant academic theory of judicial
review is one that would importantly involve the judges in assessing the wisdom of the democratic branches' choices. 33
Whether it is Laurence Tribe telling the justices it is their job to
make "difficult substantive choices among competing values, and
indeed amon~inevitably controverted political, social, and moral
conceptions," or Ronald Dworkin assuring them that it "is too
late for the old, cowardly, story about judges not being responsible for makinfo" such choices, "or that it is undemocratic for
them to try," 3 the message is clear: government by the people
may be an ennobling myth, but sometimes the people get it
wrong, and as the reflective elite element in our law-making system, the justices must keep them within the bounds of what is
acceptable to the reasoning class.

31. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard
U. Press, 1980).
32. Or worse. See, e.g., Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 90
(Yale U. Press, 1996) ("Although Ely's effort on Warren's behalf proved herculean, academic lawyers of all ideologies responded with groans .... "); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 841
F.2d 1329, 1356 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (entire footnote) ("That
Dean John Hart Ely has 'severely criticized' Roe v. Wade, maj. op. at 1341 n.21, makes
the majority's position no more persuasive and Roe v. Wade no less binding or important
a constitutional decision"). In light of the results of Professor Kalman's survey, I would
have thought my critique of Roe had probably strengthened its authoritativeness.
33. Fortunately, the justices are only intermittently convinced, with the result that
our system can quite justifiably be labeled democratic, most of the time.
34. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 584 (Foundation Press, 2d ed.
1988).
35. Ronald M. Dworkin, Freedom's Law 38 (Harvard U. Press, 1996). (I confess I
find elusive the sense in which it is "cowardly" to trust the judgment of the citizenry at
large, rather than preserving a veto for people like ourselves.)
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Such recommendations turn my stomach, but I'm a democrat:36 except where the majority is subjecting some despised or
negatively stereotyped minority to inferior treatment or effec37
tively barring its members from the process of governing, I
simply cannot understand by what right the educated elite can
lay claim to any sort of veto on the collective judgment of its
(okay, our) fellow citizens. 38 But though I don't buy it, I can un36. In my more paranoid moments I begin to feel as if, at least among constitutional
theorists, I'm the only one. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery:
Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 Const. Comm. 271, 274 (1997)
(footnotes omitted):
Conservative constitutional commentators insist that principled justices would
sustain bans on abortion and strike down affirmative action policies; their liberal peers insist that principled justices would strike down bans on abortion and
sustain affirmative action policies. Libertarians would have justices strike down
bans on abortion and affirmative action policies; democrats would have justices
sustain both measures.
Two or three commentators are cited for each school, save ~democrats," where I am the
only one. (Parenthetically, I am also an unacknowledged counterexample to what Graber thinks all this proves, that ~Controversial cases in leading studies consistently come
out 'right,' as 'right' is defined by the theorist's political commitments." Id. I've always
been opposed to laws of the sort struck down in Roe, and said so in my criticism of that
case. For the most part, though, I expect he is right.) And of course-the paranoia's
lifting-l'm not the only democratic constitutional theorist: Why, there's Jurgen Habermas, and Henry Monaghan, and Mike Klarman, and ... let me get back to you on this.
37. See also Martin Luther King, Jr., ~Letter from the Birmingham Jail," in Martin
Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait 85-86 (Harper & Row, 1964):
Let us consider a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An unjust law is a
code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but
does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By the same token, a
just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to
follow itself. This is sameness made legal.
Let me give another explanation. A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority
that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting or devising the law.
Actually, given the proclivities of legislatures, these two exceptions generate a quite energetic theory of judicial review and justify most of the modem Court's "activism." See
Ely, Democracy and Distrust chs. 5 & 6 (cited in note 31 ).
38. It is true that from time to time there have been inserted in the Constitution
provisions (surprisingly few, actually) that cannot without some questionable pulling and
hauling be made to conform to either of these accounts-provisions that, candidly considered, protect against legislative interference with some nonparticipational, nonegalitarian value their supporters thought unusually important. True, at the time the provision was inserted its supporters commanded the substantial (elected) supermajority
required to enact a constitutional provision: two-thirds of each house of Congress plus a
majority in at least three-quarters of the state legislatures. Nonetheless, enforcing the
substantive value judgments of people no longer alive, no matter how overwhelming
their majority, may seem only marginally less "undemocratic" than having appointed
judges impose their substantive values. Democracy and Distrust at 8-12 (cited in note 31).
However, values that are neither participational nor egalitarian do not belong in a
constitutive document, at least not in ours. Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at
Mid-Century, 6 J. Leg. Educ. 457, 463-64 (1954). It is therefore no surprise to find that
whenever such constitutionally sheltered substantive values have posed a real threat to
contemporarily popular policy, they have been quite expeditiously expelled from the
Constitution, by either official (Article V) or judicial amendment. Ely, Democracy and
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derstand the contrary position, that intelligent, reflective people
are likely to be, well, more intelligent and reflective than the
masses and "therefore" their views on how the nation should
govern itself should be entitled to special weight, an ultimate
veto when necessary. The idea obviously did not originate with
John Adams or his contemporaries: it dates back at least as far
as Plato39 and Aristotle. 40
Thus although mixed government is not the theory that best
fits our constitutional charter, especially as it has evolved
through amendment,41 it possesses an ancient alternative pedigree. And given that the educated and well-born will inevitably
exercise disproportionate influence in determining our form of
government, I suppose it is virtually inevitable. But please, gang,
admit that what you're advocating is a mixture of government by
the people generally and government by an unelected elite comprising people like yourselves. Stop calling it democracy.

Distrust at 99-100 (cited in note 31).
39. B. Jowett, ed., Laws, Ill, The Dialogues of Plalo, V, 72-75 (Oxford, 3d. ed.
1892}.
40. Politics, II, 6, pp. 60-61; IV, 9, pp. 177-84; V, 9, p. 232. See generally Kurt von
Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity (Columbia U. Press, 1954).
41. Democracy and Distrust at 88-101 (cited in note 31}.

